Aanklooien

Voordat ik hierheen kwam had ik oprecht geen idee waar ik aan begon: niet van de mensen, niet van de omgeving, niet van het studeren. De eerste dagen waren goed om even aan de eerste twee te wennen, maar het laatste moest toch echt wachten tot de eerste collegeweek.

En wat was het wennen. Pas als je hier eenmaal aan de gang beng realiseer je je hoe rustig je het als student in Nederland hebt, en als rechtenstudent helemaal. Hier werkt iedereen zo verschrikkelijk hard, en dat bijna permanent—je verzint het niet.

Dat harde werken begint ondertussen wel te wennen en zelfs al heb ik helemaal geen goede cijfers nodig, ik vind niet dat ik niks kan gaan zitten doen. En zo kan het dan gebeuren dat je op een nacht tot 3:30 op bent om een response paper af te schrijven over Federalist Paper #10, van James Madison. Voor het gevoel dring je maar niet door tot de kern en kun je maar geen goede vraag verzinnen, en besluit je om 2:00 maar iets te kiezen om mee te werken dat redelijk genoeg is. Om 3:30 ben je dan klaar, opgelucht maar met het gevoel dat wat had je hebt geschreven totale stierenpoep is. Met kleine oogjes lever je het in bij je docent, om het vandaag terug te krijgen.

De totale stierenpoep die ik dacht dat het was, blijkt het toch niet te zijn:

\”This is a superb essay, sophisticated, articulate, critical, careful and insightful–excellent. Easily the best essay I\’ve seen so far this semester. A+\”

Je kunt je nauwelijks voorstellen hoe ontzettend cool het is voor een geek als ik om zulk commentaar terug te krijgen over een stuk voor een vak dat ik nooit eerder heb gedaan maar wel erg gaaf vind, dat ik niet in m\’n moedertaal schreef en dat me zelfs niet erg goed leek.

Studeren kàn best leuk zijn. \’t Is soms alleen een beetje wennen, maar van zulke dingen kan ik nou heel vrolijk worden. Raar hè?

 

Voor de geïnteresseerden: dit was de paper, judge for yourselves:

 

American Political Thought, dr. Mariotti
Response paper
Wouter van Erve                                                          

Week 4, Friday readings (09/19/2008): The Federalist Papers and the Constitution

Is it contradictory for Madison to argue in his Federalist Paper no. 10 the absolute ineluctability of factions, while at the same time minimizing the liberties that create them?

Madison starts off his argument by giving his definition of a faction. According to him, a faction is \”a number of citizens [in majority or minority] who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community\”. From this definition it becomes clear that he sees any opposition to government policy as a possible problem and it is therefore that he sets out to write, trying to find a solution.

In his essay, Madison argues that removing the cause of all factions, by taking away civil liberties or by eliminating differences between citizens, would be worse than any faction itself. Therewith, he acknowledges the value of dissenting opinions in a democratic society; however, he appears to still want to control those dissenting opinions, in order to minimize their-to his eyes-negative effects. From my point of view, it seems like Madison wants to preserve the stability of the union at all cost.

In his efforts to protect the union\’s stability, however, I cannot help but to think that he contradicts himself slightly, or at least shows some signs of ambiguity. An example: while he states that sacrificing civil liberties to remove the causes of factions would be a bad thing, he does not seem to have a problem in restraining those civil liberties-Madison does not seem to be a big fan of a direct democracy. That becomes even more apparent when, on page 156 of his essay, he uses terms like \”sinister\” and \”danger\” in reference to minority or majority factions. He appears to want to persuade his readership to believe that having a direct democracy can only have detrimental effects on the stability of their union.

He then proposes his solution to this problem, and it is only then that the bigger contradictions in his argumentation become visible. His system of government, proposing the governing of the union through representation, is intensely undemocratic, difficult to influence, while at the same time extremely protective of its representative body. Madison argues that this representative body should consist of \”characters (…) [of] attractive merit\”, thereby, in my view, silently advocating an elitist representation. And by subsequently enlarging the number of electors, it becomes harder for dissenters to effectively voice their concerns, as it is now harder to form a majority. And a dissenting minority can do nothing but to \”clog the administration\”, as Madison himself so aptly states.

The slightly cynical mind of a conspiracy theorist could argue that in the proposed system, these representatives, elected by the people of the union, represent a minority, of a higher rank, placed above ‘normal\’ society. A minority Madison himself, being a man of great wisdom, perhaps counted on becoming part of. A minority also that would not like to get stripped of its power of ruling the people, by those people-the majority. Would it, perhaps, be the case, that Madison would not like to see himself easily dethroned, once elected? Or would Madison\’s concerns for a stable union really have been at the base of this democracy-opposing form of government?

It is hard to see how this line of thought would not have crossed Madison\’s mind when he set out to formulate his theory. While it may not have been his primary concern, I do believe that the idea of leaving the masses out of the business of running a government must have been a factor in conceiving this idea.

However, while federalization can lead to a stable form of government, it does not necessarily always have to turn out that way (i.e.: the current political state of Belgium) and neither does a thoroughly democratic society have to be unstable (i.e.: Switzerland). The majority may not always know best, it is harder for them to lose the collective trust of the people than for a governing minority to lose it-and then win it back.